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  1Background 
In many geographical regions, both in developing and in developed countries, the number 
of health workers is insufficient to achieve population health goals. Financial incentives 
for return of service are intended to alleviate health worker shortages: A (future) health 
worker enters into a contract to work for a number of years in an underserved area in 
exchange for a financial pay-off.  
 
Methods 
We carried out a systematic literature search of PubMed for studies evaluating outcomes 
of financial-incentive programs published between 1957 and 2007. To identify articles 
for review, we combined three search themes (health workers or students, underserved 
areas, and financial incentives). Each theme was operationalized using the Medical 
Subject Headings of US National Library of Medicine. In the initial search, we identified 
5,565 articles, 5,449 of which were excluded based on screening of titles and abstracts, 
and a further 90 were excluded after full-text review, leaving 26 articles to be included in 
the final review. We computed random-effects estimates of the pooled proportion of 
participants in financial-incentive programs who were successfully recruited to practice 
in underserved areas. 
 
Results 
With three exceptions – from Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa – all of the 
programs evaluated in one of the reviewed studies are located in the US. The programs 
started between 1930 and 1998. Financial incentives ranged from year-2000 US Dollar 
  21,358 to 28,470.  All reviewed studies are observational. The random-effects estimate of 
the pooled recruitment proportion was 69% (95% confidence interval 61-77%). In 
comparison to programs with buy-out options, programs without such an option had 
significantly higher pooled recruitment proportions (84% vs 65%, p < 0.001) but also 
significantly higher proportions of default (on either service or payment obligation) (16% 
vs 3%, p < 0.001). The proportion of program participants who remained in an 
underserved area after completing their obligation ranged from 25% to 90%. Four studies 
find that program participants are significantly less likely to remain in the underserved 
area of initial practice than non-participants, while one study does not find a significant 
difference. In contrast, four studies investigating retention in service to the underserved in 
general (i.e. not only in the area of initial practice) find higher retention rates in 
participants than in non-participants, while only one study finds the opposite. 
 
Conclusions 
Existing studies suggest that financial incentives for return of service can be effective in 
increasing the number of health workers in underserved areas. However, in most 
programs large proportions of participants do not serve their obligation. Future studies 
need to investigate whether financial-incentive programs can be effective in developing 





  3Introduction 
In many geographical regions, both in developing and in developed countries, the number 
of health workers is insufficient to achieve population health goals.  The 2004 Joint 
Learning Initiative (JLI) report Human Resources for Health estimated that “Sub-Saharan 
countries must nearly triple their current numbers of workers by adding the equivalent of 
one million workers through retention, recruitment, and training if they are to come close 
to approaching the MDGs [Millennium Development Goals] for health” [1]; the 2006 
World Health Report concluded that “[t]he severity of the health workforce crisis in some 
of the world’s poorest countries is illustrated by WHO estimates that 57 of them (36 of 
which are in Africa) have a deficit of 2.4 million doctors, nurses and midwives” [2].  In 
developed countries, certain areas, such as rural or poor communities, are commonly 
underserved with health workers, leaving substantial proportions of the population 
without access to complete primary health care [3-5].
1   
 
Interventions intended to alleviate health worker shortages include selective recruitment 
and training for practice in underserved areas, improvements in working conditions or 
living conditions, and compulsion or incentives [6].  In this article, we systematically 
review the evidence on one specific set of policy interventions: financial incentives for 
return of service.  These interventions work as follows.  A health worker in training or a 
fully trained health worker enters into a contract to work for a number of years in an 
                                                 
1 In this article, unless otherwise specified, we use the term underserved area to encompass underserved 
communities, regions, and populations within countries, as well as countries where by some standards even 
the best-served geographical regions are underserved.  The precise definition of an underserved area differs 
across the financial incentive programs evaluated in the studies reviewed in this article.  The different 
definitions are shown in Table 1. 
 
  4underserved area in exchange for a financial pay-off.  Financial incentives can increase 
the numbers of health workers in underserved areas by two mechanisms.  First, they can 
redirect the flow of those health workers who would have been educated without any 
financial incentive from well-served to underserved areas, for instance by decreasing the 
net emigration flow of nurses and physicians from developing to developed countries [7-
9] or by increasing the net flow of physicians from urban tertiary care to rural primary 
care in developed countries [10, 11].  This first mechanism can take hold if there are 
(future) health workers who normally would not work in an underserved area, but who 
are willing to do so in return for a financial incentive.  Financial-incentive programs will 
increase social well-being through this mechanism if the difference between the marginal 
benefits of a health worker in an underserved area and a well-served area is positive and 
larger than the cost of the financial incentive to redirect a health worker from the latter to 
the former. 
  
Second, financial-incentive programs can add health workers to the pool of workers who 
would have been educated in the absence of such programs and place them in 
underserved areas.  The second mechanism can take hold if, on the one hand, there are 
qualified candidates who would not have the means to finance a health care education 
without a financial incentive and, on the other hand, a country’s health care education 
system can absorb additional students.  Financial incentive programs will increase social 
well-being through this mechanism if the marginal benefit of an additional health worker 
in an underserved area exceeds the cost of the financial incentive to educate her and place 
her in such an area.   
  5 
We have recently shown that a specific type of financial-incentive program, scholarships 
in return for a commitment to deliver antiretroviral treatment in Sub-Saharan Africa, is 
highly cost-beneficial under a wide range of assumptions [12].  In the following, we will 
first update a previous systematic review of financial incentives for return of service.  
Then, we will critically summarize the findings from existing studies and draw 
implications for policy and future research.  One previous study has systematically 
reviewed financial-incentive programs for return of service.  Sempowski (2004) reviewed 
10 studies of financial-incentive programs published between January 1966 and July 
2002 [13].  The author concludes that “ROS [return-of-service] programs to rural and 
underserviced areas have achieved their primary goal of short-term recruitment but have 
had less success with long-term retention” [13].  Prima facie, an update of the previous 
systematic review is useful because more than five years have passed since the end of the 
period of publication of articles considered in the review.  The Cochrane Collaboration 
recommends that systematic reviews “should be updated at least every two years” [14] 
and a 2007 study of 100 systematic reviews in the medical sciences found that 23% 
needed updating within two years after the end of the search period, and 50% needed 
updating within 5.5 years [15].   
 
In addition to the update of evidence, our systematic review differs from the previous 
review in two aspects.  First, the previous review was restricted to studies of physicians, 
while we consider studies of all types of health workers.  Second, the previous review 
included only studies investigating a small set of program outcomes (“initial recruitment 
  6of physicians, buyout rates and long-term retention”) [13].  Our review considers all 
studies of program results (i.e. descriptions of outcomes among program participants 
without comparison to outcomes in non-participants), program effects (i.e. analysis of 
program effectiveness at the individual-level through comparison of outcomes among 
participants and non-participants), and program impacts (i.e. analysis of program 




Data sources and search strategies 
We carried out a systematic literature search of PubMed for studies evaluating outcomes 
of financial incentives for return of service published between January 1957 and 
December 2007.  In addition, we searched the reference lists of all publications included 
in the final review as well as of all articles that were excluded from the review because 
they were review articles, editorials, or commentaries.  Finally, we asked colleagues with 
a research interest in human resources for health to identify articles on financial 
incentives for return of service.   
 
To identify articles for review, we combined three search themes using the Boolean 
operator “and”.  The first search theme – health workers or students – combined the 
following Medical subject headings (MeSH) [16] using the Boolean operator “or”: 
"Health Manpower", "Health Personnel", "Students", “Internship and Residency" or 
“Education, Medical".  The second theme – underserved areas – combined MeSH terms 
  7“Medically Underserved Area” or "Professional Practice Location" or “Rural Health” or 
"Primary Health Care" or “Family Practice” or “Career Choice”.  The third theme – 
financial incentives – combined MeSH terms “Financial Support" or "Training Support" 
or "Physician Incentive Plans" or “Health Planning".  All MeSH terms were used in their 
“exploded” versions, i.e., in addition to the selected MeSH term, all narrower terms that 
are categorized below it in the MeSH hierarchy are included in the PubMed search.  For 
instance, the exploded version of the MeSH term “Training Support” includes the term 
“Fellowships and Scholarships” which is positioned below “Training Support” in the 
MeSH hierarchy.  Entry terms linked to the MeSH term “Training Support” include 
“Student Loans” and “Educational Subsidies”.  A complete list of MeSH terms and their 
associated concepts can be found on the MeSH website [16]. 
 
Selection criteria 
Articles were considered for inclusion in the systematic review if they reported data from 
a quantitative study of results, effects, or impacts of at least one financial-incentive 
program for return of service.  We considered articles published in any language.  We 
excluded studies that evaluate programs that attempt to increase the number of health 
workers in underserved areas primarily through non-financial means.  For instance, 
studies evaluating the Physician Shortage Area Program (PSAP) of Jefferson Medical 
College were excluded because the program strives to increase the number of rural family 
physicians primarily through selective admission of candidates to medical school and 
through intensive exposure of the program participants to rural family practice, while 
offering only “a small amount of additional financial aid […] almost entirely in the form 
  8of repayable loans”, which “represents only a small portion of each student’s entire 
tuition and expenses” (Rabinowitz et al. 2005).  Reviews, commentaries, editorials, news 
and policy briefs were excluded.  Studies of financial incentives for return of service 
within the military (e.g. [17]) were excluded because experiences with return-of-service 
programs in the military are likely to be very different from civilian experiences, as the 
military can exert more control over its members than most civilian institutions over 
citizens.  Studies of financial incentives for research positions (e.g. [18]) were excluded 
because health workers who conduct medical research are commonly motivated by very 
different factors than health workers in patient care [19], and the objective of this article 
is to examine the evidence on financial incentives for return of service in underserved 
areas.  Finally, we excluded studies that only report outcomes that cannot be objectively 
verified, such as participant or family satisfaction with the financial-incentives program.  
Figure 1 shows a flowchart of the systematic review.  5,449 of 5,557 articles were 
excluded based on their English-language titles or abstracts as listed in PubMed.  All 
articles remaining in the search pool after the initial screening were in English.   
 
< Figure 1 > 
 
Statistical analysis 
We used DerSimonian and Laird meta-analysis [20] to compute both fixed- and random-
effects estimates of the pooled proportion (and its 95% confidence (CI) interval) of 
program participants who were successfully recruited for practice in underserved areas 
(the recruitment proportion).  Because the meta-analysis assumes that the measure to be 
  9pooled across studies is normally distributed, we first used the arcsine-transformation to 
normalize the distribution of the recruitment proportions [21].  After meta-analysis of the 
transformed variable, we retransformed the pooled mean and its 95% CI back to 
proportions.  Heterogeneity of the recruitment proportion across studies was diagnosed 
with the Q test [22].  When significant heterogeneity was present, we selected the 
random-effects estimates.   
 
Results 
Table 1 describes the research topics that are investigated by the studies included in the 
review and the number of studies investigating each research topic (in parentheses).  The 
numbers in parentheses add up to 35 rather than 26 (i.e. the number of studies included in 
this review) because seven studies investigate more than one topic (five studies 
investigate two topics and two studies investigate three topics).   
 
< Table 1 > 
 
Table 2 shows descriptions of each of the programs that were evaluated in at least one of 
the included studies.  When information on some program characteristics was not 
available in the reviewed study itself, we extracted the information from other sources 
(shown in the column “Other sources” in Table 2).  All monetary values in the column 
“Financial incentives and conditions” in Table 2 are shown both as they are provided in 
the reviewed study and – for ease of comparison – in year-2000 United States dollars 
(USD).  We used the purchasing power parity index from the World Bank Development 
  10Indicators [23] in order to translate the values of a non-US currency into US dollars and 
the consumer price index from the US Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics 
[24] to adjust for differences in the real value of one USD over time.   
 
All programs evaluated in one of the studies included in this review started between 1930 
and 1998.  With the exception of five programs that accept a range of health professionals 
(the North Carolina Rural Loan Program, the National Health Service Corps (NHSC), the 
West Virginia Recruitment and Retention Community Project, and the West Virginia 
State Loan Repayment Program in the US, as well as the Friends of Mosvold Program in 
South Africa) the financial incentives of the evaluated programs are targeted only at 
future or current physicians (Table 2).    
 
With the exception of two programs that cover, respectively, university tuition, fees and 
“other reasonable educational expenses, such as books, supplies, and equipment” [25] 
and “funds for university tuition, books, residence fees and food” [26], monetary values 
of the financial incentives were available for all programs from one of the reviewed 
studies.  The financial incentives per year of service ranged from year-2000 USD 1,358 to 
28,470 (Table 2).  One study compares the average award amount across five types of 
programs (scholarship programs, loan programs with service option, loan repayment 
programs, direct financial-incentive programs, and resident support) and does not find 
significant differences [27].  
 
< Table 2 > 
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We identified 26 studies that met all our inclusion and exclusion criteria.  The previous 
systematic review of the financial-incentive programs for return of service by Sempowski 
[13] identified only 10 articles, three of which were not included in our review.  Two 
articles were not included because they evaluate a program that “tried to increase the 
number of health workers in underserved areas primarily through non-financial means” 
[28, 29] (Figure 1); one study was not included  because it does not report “data from a 
quantitative study of results, effects, or impacts of financial incentives for return of 
service” [30] (see above).  Of 19 articles not included in the previous review but in our 
study, nine were not included in the previous review because they were published after 
the end of its review period (i.e. after 2002) [27, 31-37]; the remaining 10 studies were 
not included because of differences in inclusion and exclusion criteria.  In particular, our 
review considers programmatic outcomes and health worker types that were not covered 
in the previous review (see above). 
 
Of the 26 reviewed studies, 13 evaluate the performance of the NHSC, 10 evaluate 
financial-incentive programs in US states, three evaluate programs in English-speaking 
developed countries (Canada, New Zealand), and one evaluates a program in an English-
speaking developing country (South Africa).
2  Table 3 describes the topics, design, 
sample, data sources, outcome measures and effect sizes, conclusions, and 
methodological limitations of all studies included in the review.  Of the 22 studies in 
which individuals were the unit of observation, sample sizes for analyses were less than 
                                                 
2 One study evaluates jointly the NHSC and US state programs (see Table 2).  It is included in the count of 
both studies evaluating the NHSC and studies evaluating US state programs. 
  121,000 in 17 studies and more than one thousand in 5 studies (sample size range across all 
studies: 24 to 20,757 individuals). 
 
< Table 3 > 
 
Types of financial-incentive programs for return of service 
The financial-incentive programs in the reviewed studies vary with regard to spending 
restrictions, the relative timing of commitment, payment and service, and whether they 
require financial payback in addition to service or offer financial payback as an 
alternative to service (Table 2).  In the case of financial-incentive programs for students – 
service-requiring scholarships and educational loans – the enrollees commit to the service 
before the start of their health care education, receive money during their education, and 
fulfill their service after completion of education and training.  Scholarships do not 
require financial payback, while student loans with service requirement involve both 
financial payback and service, and so-called service-option loans offer financial payback 
as an alternative to service (compare [27, 38, 39]).  In the case of financial-incentive 
programs for medical residents – loan repayments and direct financial incentives – 
program participants receive payments during their residencies and start serving the 
obligation after completing the residencies.  Fully trained health professionals who enroll 
in loan repayment or direct financial-incentive programs commit to service in an 
underserved area shortly before or after completing their residencies and start receiving 
payments when they take up their service positions.  Loan repayments can, of course, 
  13only be used for the purpose of repaying (educational) loans, while direct financial 
incentives can be used for any purpose. 
 
Program result: recruitment 
The recruitment proportion (measured as the proportion of program participants who had 
completed or were completing their obligation among all participants who were available 
for practice) varied between 33% and 100% (Table 3).  The random-effects pooled 
recruitment proportion across all 24 programs for which individual-program recruitment 
was reported in one of the studies included in this review was 69% (95% CI 61-77%, 
heterogeneity p < 0.001) [35-37, 40-44].   
 
Program participants who are available for practice but do not fulfill their commitment to 
work in an underserved area either default on their obligation or buy out of it.  Of the 
programs evaluated in studies of recruitment, only four did not offer a buy-out option [36, 
38, 41, 43].  Some programs allowed participants to repay half [45] or all [40, 46] of the 
principal without interest en lieu of service repayment; other programs set the buy-out 
price at the principal plus interest (the “prevailing rate of interest”, or a fixed rate of 
interest varying between 2% and 10% [44]); while yet other programs charged a buy-out 
price of the principal plus a penalty (“principal plus penalty up to 100%”, or “triple the 
loan amount plus interest” [35]).   
 
The random-effects pooled recruitment proportion across those programs that did not 
offer a buy-out option (84%, 95% CI 73-92%, heterogeneity p < 0.001) was significantly 
  14higher (p < 0.001) than the pooled recruitment proportion across those programs that did 
allow buy-out (65%, 95% CI 56-74%, heterogeneity p < 0.001).  The random-effects 
pooled default proportion across those programs that did not offer a buy-out option (16%, 
95% CI 8-27%, heterogeneity p < 0.001) was significantly higher (p < 0.001) than the 
pooled default proportion across those programs that did allow buy-out (3%, 95% CI 1-
7%, heterogeneity p < 0.001).  Only two of the programs included in the above meta-
analysis of recruitment charged penalties equal to or greater than the principal.  Those 
two programs had a significantly (p < 0.001) higher random-effects pooled recruitment 
proportion (72%, 95% CI 66-78%, heterogeneity p = 0.114) than those programs that 
offered buy-out but did not charge a penalty (64%, 95% CI 54-75%, heterogeneity p < 
0.001). 
 
Program result: retention 
The proportion of program participants who remain in a underserved areas after 
completing their obligation ranges from 25% to 90% across the nine studies of retention 
that report this measure [35, 36, 40, 44-49].  While these proportions indicate that some 
substantial proportions of program participants can be retained in underserved areas, the 
reported proportions cannot be meaningfully compared to each other, because the 
definition of retention, the sampling criteria, and the observation intervals differ across 
the studies.  The studies measure retention in any small community [46], in any rural 
community [36, 44, 45, 48, 49], in any community in a specific US state [35], in the 
underserved area of original program placement [35, 40, 48, 49], or in a practice entered 
during a specific period of time [47].  Some studies measure retention among all program 
  15participants who had completed their obligation between the start of the program and the 
start of the study – a time interval that varies widely across this subset of studies (5 years 
[36, 40], 22 years [48], 24 years [45], and 25 years [35]), and is not reported in one study 
[44].  Two other studies measure retention in samples of people who graduated from 
medical school or took up practice in an underserved area  during a time interval that 
ended some years before the start of the study; these studies differ in the length of their 
enrollment period (3 years [49] vs. 14 years [46]) and the length of the period between 
the end of the enrollment period and the start of the study (9, 11, and 14 years across 
three cohorts [49] vs. 29 years [46]).   
 
Program effect: retention and care 
In all eight studies of program effect, program participation is defined as having received 
a financial incentive and having served the obligation; i.e., people who received a 
financial incentive but could not be recruited to serve in an underserved area are excluded 
from the cohorts of program participants.  Table 4 shows four categories of effect studies 
by outcome measure and sample.  Three categories investigate retention (in the same 
area, in the same underserved area, or in any underserved area) and one category 
investigates provision of care in any underserved area. 
 
< Table 4 > 
 
With one exception (which did not find any significant difference [37]) all studies that 
compare retention in the same (underserved) areas between program participants and 
  16non-participants find that participants are significantly less likely to remain in the same 
(underserved) area [27, 32, 50, 51].  On the other hand, with one exception (which found 
that NHSC participants faced a significantly higher hazard of non-retention in rural 
practice than non-participants [50]), all studies that compare differences in retention in 
any (underserved) area between participants and non-participants find that participants 
are significantly more likely to continue to practice in any (underserved) area [32, 52] or 
to work with an underserved populations [31, 52, 53]. 
 
The studies of program effect report either hazard ratios [27, 50], odds ratios [31, 51, 53], 
relative risks [37, 52] or beta-coefficients [32] to compare retention among program 
participants and non-participants.  Except for the studies that report hazard ratios, which 
take into account the duration of retention of each individual in the sample, these studies 
use a binary concept of retention measured at different time intervals after the initial 
observation (at least 1 year [37], 3 years and 1 month and 5 years and 1 month [51]) or 
after graduation from medical school (7-9 years [32], 7 and 11 years [52], 9-10 years 
[53], 29 years or less [31]).   
 
Program impact: health system and health 
Four articles examine whether financial-incentive programs have led to changes in the 
number or density (i.e. number per population) of certain types health workers [34, 40, 
45, 54, 55].  One of the four studies describes the medical student density in Arizona over 
time to conclude that a scholarship aiming to increase student density was not effective 
[45].  Two studies compare changes over time (in physician numbers, from 1966 to 1972 
  17[40] and in physician densities, from 1956 to 1986 [54]) in northern Ontario to changes in 
these measures in Ontario as a whole in order to investigate the impact of a financial- 
incentive program on the supply of physicians in underserved areas in northern Ontario.  
The first study concludes that an observed increase in the absolute number of physicians 
in northern Ontario was likely caused by the program (because the speed of increase rose 
substantially after introduction of the program in northern Ontario, while there was no 
change in the speed of increase in Ontario overall) [40].  The second study concludes that 
an increase in physician density in northern Ontario was not due to the program but due 
to the overall increase of physicians in the province (because a measure of inequality 
between physician density in northern Ontario and Ontario as a whole did not improve) 
[54].  It is possible that an initial effect of the program in the first three years after its 
introduction (from 1969 to 1972) – as reported in the first study [40] – ceased to exist in 
the longer run (until 1986) – as reported in the second study [54]. 
 
Two further studies of health system impacts of financial-incentive programs use 
communities as units of observation.  One of the studies investigates whether 
underserved areas that succeed in attracting obligated physicians are different from 
communities that fail to do so.  It finds that communities that are economically worse-off 
and have worse population health are less likely to receive an obligated physician than 
communities that are economically better-off and have better population health [55].  The 
second study investigates whether the presence of an obligated physician in a community 
changes the supply of non-obligated physicians to that community and finds that when 
controlling for a range of demographic, economic, and health systems factors the 
  18presence of an obligated physician increases the inflow of non-obligated physicians into a 
community [34].  Only one study analyzes the effect of a financial-incentive program on 
a health outcome [33].  The study compares age-adjusted all-cause mortality rates in two 
periods, 15 years apart, in underserved communities with different levels of staffing by 
obligated physicians.  It finds no clear relationship between the level of staffing and 
changes in mortality.   
 
Causal inferences 
Causal inferences from studies reporting program results are necessarily weak, because 
the studies lack control groups of individuals who did not receive a financial incentive.  
The studies of program effect, on the other hand, are based on comparison of cohorts of 
program participants and non-participants over time.  Causal inferences from cohort 
studies, however, can be limited by confounding factors or by selective enrollment into 
one of the cohorts.  Of the eight studies of program effect, seven control for additional 
variables in the comparison of retention and provision of care between people who did 
and did not participate in a financial-incentive program [31, 32, 50-53, 56].  Four of these 
studies control for sex of the health worker [31, 32, 53, 56], three for his or her ethnicity 
[31, 32, 53], three for medical specialty [31, 50, 56], two for age [32, 56], and one for 
marital status [56].  One study assesses and then controls for measures of community-
physician match and physician and family satisfaction with working and living in the 
placement community [51].  Another study does not show the particular control variables, 
but reports that its effect measures remained significant “while controlling for selected 
characteristics of physicians” [52].   
  19 
One study uses a bivariate probit selection model to control for the potential bias due to 
selective participation in the financial-incentive program by those types of medical 
students who have a high propensity to remain in an underserved area [32].  The study 
uses four medical school characteristics as exclusion restrictions (i.e., variables that 
determine participation but do not independently determine retention).  It seems likely 
that unobserved individual characteristics influence both the choice of medical school 
and the decision to continue practicing in an underserved area in the long run.  For 
instance, students who choose a medical school with a higher “historical proportion” of 
students entering primary care (which is one of the exclusion restrictions used [32]) may 
be more likely to be satisfied practicing for many years in an underserved area (where 
they are most likely to work as primary care physicians [3]).  This relationship between 
choice of medical school and retention in an underserved area is independent of the 
decision to participate in a financial-incentive program and is likely to persist even after 
observed individual characteristics, such as sex, age and ethnicity, are controlled for, i.e. 
the exclusion restriction is likely invalid.   
 
Finally, the studies of program impact suffer from a number of limitations that weaken 
the strength of causal conclusions that might be drawn from them.  Four of the six studies 
observe changes over time in the availability of a financial-incentive program and an 
outcome (number or density of health workers [40, 45, 54] or mortality [54]), but do not 
control for changes over time of any other variable.  Thus, it cannot be ruled out that an 
observed relationship or the apparent lack of a relationship between the program and the 
  20outcome is due to a confounding variable.  In addition, three of the six studies of program 
impact [54, 55] [40] may suffer from ecological bias [57] because they observe variables 
at a level of aggregation that is higher than the level at which inferences are made.  For 
instance, Anderson and Rosenberg (1990) [54] observe changes in physicians density in 
counties in order to evaluate the impact of the Ontario Underserviced Area Program in 
attracting physicians to underserved communities within those counties, i.e. the observed 
average change in physician density in any one county could have been caused by an 
infinite number of combinations of changes of different directions and effect sizes in the 
different underserviced and sufficiently serviced communities in the county.  
 
Discussion 
With three exceptions – from Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa (see Table 2) – all 
of the programs evaluated in one of the reviewed studies are located in the US.  In 
absolute numbers, the US-based financial-incentive programs have made a substantial 
contribution to health care in underserved areas.  For instance, between 1972 and 2008, 
the NHSC – the largest financial-incentive program in the US – placed 27,000 primary 
care clinicians in underserved areas [58].  At the same time, the NHSC has met only a 
small proportion of national unmet health care need.  In February 2008, 4,600 NHSC 
clinicians were serving 5 million people in underserved areas, while the NHSC estimated 
that 53 million people “still lack access to quality health care in the United States” [58]. 
 
While most of the evaluated programs were located in the US, the US market for health 
care education is unusual in comparison to many other countries in that students pay high 
  21tuition for their education.  Countries where students of health care do not usually incur 
large debt (such as many Western and Eastern European countries, Cuba, Malaysia, and 
Saudi Arabia) may not be as successful as the US in recruiting students and health 
professionals into programs that provide scholarships or loan repayment in return for 
service in underserved areas.  In many developing countries, on the other hand, education 
for a health profession can be quite costly because of tuition and school fees as well as 
costs of housing and living.  Some of the experiences from the US may thus be more 
applicable to health care education markets in developing countries than to other 
developed countries, even though other differences (such as the capacity to enforce and 
monitor obligated service (compare [59]) may limit generalizability to developing-
country settings.  One study from South Africa suggests that scholarship programs for 
health care education can be a successful instrument to recruit health workers for practice 
in rural Africa [43].  Future studies should evaluate outcomes of financial-incentive 
programs from other developing countries where such programs have been offered in the 
past or are currently offered, such as Swaziland [60], Ghana [61], and Mexico [62]. 
   
Notwithstanding the above caveats about generalizability, some stylized facts and 
implications for policy and future research emerge from our systematic review.  First, 
most of the financial-incentive programs experienced substantial losses to recruitment 
before the start of the service obligation.  These losses were lower in programs without a 
buy-out option than in programs that allowed buy-out.  Among programs that allowed 
buy-out, those that financially penalized such a choice experienced lower losses than 
programs that did not.  Because we lacked data to control for differences between 
  22programs in self-selection to enroll, it is unclear whether the observed differences in 
recruitment for work in underserved areas are due to selection effects – individuals who 
are less certain about their eventual willingness to fulfill an obligation to serve in an 
underserved area may be less likely to enroll in programs that do not offer buy-out or 
financially penalize it – or due to an effect of buy-out and penalties on the probability of 
recruitment independent of selective enrollment.  Our results thus do not necessarily 
imply that policy makers should not allow buy-out, nor that they should charge 
substantial financial penalties.  High financial penalties or the absence of a buy-out 
option may deter a proportion of individuals from program participation who would have 
a reasonable probability of fulfilling their service obligation after their health care 
training in return for a financial incentive.   
 
This deterrence could have negative effects on program performance.  For one, programs 
may not be able to attract a sufficient number of participants.  One of the reviewed 
studies reports that program management lowered the buy-out price in early phases of the 
program in order to increase the number of applicants [45].  In addition, program 
effectiveness in increasing the number of health workers practicing in underserved areas 
may decrease, because only those (future) health workers who are very certain that they 
want to practice in such an area will sign up for the financial-incentive programs.  These 
health workers, however, are likely to practice in underserved areas even without a 
financial incentive.  In contrast, health workers who are comparatively uncertain whether 
they want to eventually practice in an underserved area and averse to taking risks may 
decide not to sign up for the program, even though many of them would have served in 
  23an underserved area, had they enrolled in a financial-incentive program with a low buy-
out price.  Finally, programs may lose income if they strongly deter or do not offer buy-
out.  If the buy-out price is set such that the program makes a profit if a candidate repays 
her obligation, the cash flows from buy-out could be used to financially sustain a 
program.  Theoretically, the buy-out price could be set at a level to fully compensate for 
the loss of social value incurred because a program participant does not fulfill her 
obligation.  In this case, the candidate would pay the opportunity costs of her service, i.e. 
the amount of money needed to attract another health worker of equal qualification to the 
underserved area in which she would have served.  We find that the proportion of 
participants who default (i.e. who neither fulfill their obligation nor buy-out) was 12 
percentage points higher in programs that did not offer buy-out than in programs that did 
(p < 0.001).  If the repayment price in programs that offer buy-out fully offset the loss of 
social value from participants failing to fulfill their service obligation, policy makers 
should prefer these programs over programs without buy-out option. 
 
Second, participants in financial-incentive programs were significantly more likely to 
leave their first site of practice after completion of their obligation than non-obligated 
health workers in comparable sites of first practice after similar length of service.  There 
may be several reasons for this finding.  For one, those health workers who find practice 
in any underserved area less attractive than practice in sites that are not underserved, but 
who nevertheless decide to complete their obligation, are likely to leave the underserved 
area once they have completed their obligated service.  On the other hand, even among 
those health workers who find practice in an underserved area to be the most attractive 
  24career path in general, the obligated health workers may be more likely to leave the site 
of initial practice than their non-obligated colleagues in underserved areas.  Obligated 
health workers have less choice over the particular underserved area in which to start 
practice than their non-obligated peers and are thus less likely to be satisfied with their 
work and life in the underserved area of first practice than their non-obligated peers.  For 
instance, one study of the NHSC concludes that NHSC enrollees “placed in rural sites in 
the late 1980s experienced a site-matching process that they felt offered few acceptable 
sites” and “offered little opportunity to locate the best-suited site among those offered” 
[51].  Financial-incentive programs aiming to achieve high retention of obligated health 
workers in the site of first practice should attempt to accommodate health workers’ 
wishes to practice in a particular underserved area as far as possible. 
 
Third, while participants in financial-incentive programs for return of service in 
underserved areas were less likely to remain in their site of first practice than non-
participants, the reviewed studies suggest that participants were more likely to practice in 
some underserved area or work with an underserved population than their peers who did 
not participate in a financial-incentive program.  This summary finding from our 
systematic review is in contrast to the conclusion of the one previous review of financial 
incentives for return of service that incentive programs “have achieved their primary goal 
of short-term recruitment but have had less success with long-term retention” [13].   
 
 
  25Financial-incentive programs in their current design are thus effective not only in placing 
health workers in a specific underserved area, but also in retaining them in service to the 
underserved in general.  Program planners intending to maximize social value could 
consider placing participants preferentially in the most underserved among all 
underserved areas, in order to test whether such a policy would affect long-term retention 
in service to the underserved.  While such a policy would strongly restrict participants’ 
choice of placement and thus run counter to policies trying to increase retention in initial 
placement sites, it might nevertheless maximize the social value of financial-incentive 
programs, if long-term retention in underserved areas remained the same, because during 
their obligation health workers are likely to have greatest impact on health outcomes 
where unmet health care need is greatest.  Without such a preferential placement policy, 
it is likely that the neediest population will benefit least from financial-incentive 
programs:  One study of the NHSC finds that the poorer an underserved area and the 
worse its population health, the less likely it is to receive an obligated physician (see 
Table 3) [55]. 
 
It is difficult to establish causality in the relationship between program participation and 
retention in underserved areas.  On the one hand, participation in a financial-incentive 
program may expose enrollees to experiences that motivate their future choice regarding 
whether to practice in underserved areas (such as rural practice), which they would not 
have had, had they not enrolled – in which case program participation could have caused 
the later choice of practice site.  On the other hand, it is also possible that those future 
health workers who are more inclined than their peers to practice in underserved areas 
  26before participation in a financial-incentive program are also more likely to participate in 
such a program and that it is the selective participation rather than a program effect that 
brings about the higher probability of participants serving in underserved areas compared 
with non-participants.   
 
Most of the studies of program effect controlled for some basic demographic 
characteristics of health workers, such as sex, age, or marital status.  However, many 
factors that would seem to be important determinants of provision of care and retention in 
underserved areas were not controlled for in any of the studies of program effect.  One 
factor that is likely to determine program effect is the income differential between these 
areas and well-served areas in which the health worker could find employment (compare, 
e.g., [63]).  The higher the differential the more attractive it will be for the health worker 
to buy out  of the obligation and, if she does not buy out, the more attractive it will be a 
move to a well-served area after completion of the service obligation. 
 
Moreover, only two studies controlled for self-selection to participate in a financial-
incentive program based on the propensity to provide care in underserved areas before 
enrollment in the program (over and above differences already captured by basic 
demographic variables).  One study investigates the association between participation and 
retention in “providing substantial care to the underserved” while controlling for “strong 
interest in underserved practice prior to medical school” [53].  Another study controls for 
selective participation, using a bivariate probit selection model [32].  Both studies find 
that NHSC participants are more likely to practice in any underserved area or provide 
  27care for an underserved population.  However, the first study uses a very restricted 
sample of individuals, limiting the generalizability of the results to other cohorts (Table 
3).  The second study controls for sample selection with two simultaneous equations, but 
it uses exclusion restrictions in the statistical estimation of the system that may not be 
valid (see above).  To confirm the finding that participation in financial-incentive 
programs increases retention in underserved areas, future studies using already-existing 
data should emphasize control of selection biases in the analyses.  Policy makers who are 
planning new programs should consider adopting experimental designs, such as cluster 
randomizing financial-incentive programs to classes of medical students, to be able to 
more rigorously test program effectiveness. 
 
Fourth, there is contradictory evidence regarding the impact of financial-incentive 
programs on health worker numbers and densities, and the evidence on impact is 
weakened by methodological limitations, including lack of control for likely confounders 
and ecological bias.  However, impact on health worker numbers and densities will be a 
function of the scale of financial-incentive programs as well as of recruitment, retention, 
and the effect of obligated heath workers on the supply of non-obligated health workers 
to underserved communities.  The scale of some of the programs reviewed in this study 
was considerable (see above).  Although there are substantial losses to recruitment to 
underserved areas across the reviewed programs, the recruited proportions of obligated 
health workers are substantially higher than the proportions of non-obligated health 
workers choosing practice in underserved areas (Table 3, compare [64, 65]).  Finally, 
financial-incentive programs may in fact increase retention in underserved areas among 
  28participants (see above).  Overall, we would thus expect that the reviewed financial-
incentive programs should have had considerable impact on health worker population 
densities in underserved areas.  One effect that could decrease such a health system 
impact is the response of non-obligated physicians to the placement of obligated health 
workers in an underserved area.  It is plausible that obligated health workers will deter 
non-obligated physicians from practice in underserved communities because the former 
will compete with the latter for patients and practice personnel.  Conversely, it seems also 
plausible that the inflow of obligated health workers into underserved communities 
attracts non-obligated physicians to the same communities as the health services 
situations in these communities stabilize and referral and exchange among colleagues 
become increasingly possible.  One of the reviewed studies shows that the presence of an 
NHSC clinician increases the supply of non-NHSC physicians to underserved areas (see 
Table 3) [34].  It is thus unlikely that changes in the supply of non-obligated physicians 
diminish the effect of financial-incentive programs on total physician supply to 
underserved areas.  Combining evidence from several studies, it thus seems probable that 
at least in the US financial-incentive programs have had a positive impact on the health 
workforce in underserved areas.   
 
Conclusion 
Financial-incentive programs for return of service are one of the few health policy 
interventions to improve the distribution of human resources for health on which 
substantial evidence exists.  Existing studies suggest that financial incentives can be 
effective in increasing the number of health workers in underserved areas.  In order to 
  29improve the scope of evidence on financial-incentive programs for return of service in 
underserved areas, future studies should evaluate programs from a more diverse set of 
countries, especially in the developing world.  In these studies, researchers should 
attempt to control selection biases as rigorously as possible, using selection models in 
observational studies and controlled experiments where funders and policy makers are 
willing to support such experiments. 
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Figure 1: Flowchart of the systematic review 
 
  5,557 Citations identified  
          through literature     
          search using  
          PubMed 
116 Potentially relevant  
       articles identified for  
       further review 
5,449 Citations excluded based on  
           screening of titles and abstracts 
•  Intervention does not include a 
financial incentive for return of 
service in patient care 
•  Outcome not a health systems or 
population health outcome 
•  No quantitative data 
•  Review studies 
•  Editorials or commentaries 
•  News or policy briefs
90 Articles excluded after full-text review 
•  Program tries to increase the number 
of health workers in underserved 
areas primarily through non-financial 
means 
•  Outcome that cannot be objectively 
verified (such as physician 
satisfaction) 
•  No quantitative data 
•  Review studies 
•  Editorials or commentaries 
•  News or policy briefs 
26 Articles included in the  
     review 
8 Articles identified from  
     reference lists or by    
     colleagues Table 1: Study topics 
 
Program result 
(Program outcomes among participants) 
Program effect 
(Program effectiveness at the individual 
level) 
Program impact 
(Program effectiveness at the population 
level) 
 
• Recruitment  
   What proportion of program participants   
   take up practice in an underserved area?  







   What proportion of program participants   
   continue to practice in an underserved  
   area at some period of time after   
   completing their obligation? 
   (10) 
 
• Retention 
   Are program participants (after  
   completion of their obligation) more  
   likely to remain at their site of first  
   practice or in any underserved area than  
   non-participants (after service of the  
   same time length as an obligation)?   
   (5) 
 
• Provision of care 
   Are program participants more likely to   
   provide care in any underserved area  
   than non-participants? 
   (4) 
 
• Health system 
   Does the program lead to improvements  
   in health system structures (such as  
   physician density)? 






   Does the program lead to improvements  
   in health outcomes (such as mortality)? 
   (1) 
 
The term underserved area in the table encompasses a specific underserved area, any underserved area, and underserved populations.  The number of studies 
investigating a topic is shown in parentheses.  The numbers in parentheses add up to 35 rather than 26 (i.e. the number of studies included in this review) because 
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Location  Period  Objective  Population  Definition of 
underserved area 































with a population 
of 5,000 or less 
(subsequently 
raised to 10,000 or 
less) 
Scholarships for medical students: 
Total of USD 1,300 per year over 4 years 
(between 1930 and 1944; amount 
equivalent to year-2000 USD 13,405 in 
1930 and 12,719 in 1944).  
In return, the students agree to spend not 
less than 3 years in practice in an 
underserved area in their state of origin. 
Fitz et al. 
1977 [46] 
N/A 











































below a certain 
threshold, rural 
community, rural 
county, rural area, 
“area of critical 
need”, anywhere in 
the state) 
Scholarships and loans with service 
option for medical students: 
Between USD 1,000 and USD 2,775 per 
year for 2-4 years (in 1970; lower amount 
equivalent to year-2000 USD 4,438, 
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name 
Location  Period  Objective  Population  Definition of 
underserved area 
Financial incentives and conditions  Evaluation  Other 




















“[A]ny town or 
village having less 
than 2,500 
population 
according to the 
last decennial 
census, or area 
outside such towns 
or villages, or area 
approved by the 
Medical Care 
Commission that is 
considered to meet 
the spirit and intent 
of the student loan 
program” 
 
Loans for students: 
USD 1,600 per year for unmarried 
students (in 1963; amount equivalent to 
year-2000 USD 9,000) and USD 1,900 
for married students (in 1963; amount 
equivalent to year-2000 USD 10,687).  
For each year the loan is received, the 
students agree to practice in an 
underserved area for one year. The loans 
bear an interest rate of 2%, beginning at 
the time the loan is advanced. The loans 
are repaid in monthly installments of 2% 
of the total amount borrowed, 











Arizona, US  Since 
1953 
“[T]o increase 











Any area in 
Arizona 
Payments to medical schools to reduce 
students’ tuition: 
USD 2,000 (in 1953; amount equivalent 
to year-2000 USD 12,899), raised to USD 
6,000 (by 1977; amount equivalent to 
year-2000 USD 17,050). 
For each year the scholarship is received, 
the students agree to practice 2 years 
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Location  Period  Objective  Population  Definition of 
underserved area 
Financial incentives and conditions  Evaluation  Other 






















Designation of an 
area as 
underserved area 
decided by a 
committee 
composed of 
members of the 
MoH, based on 
multiple factors: 
“[n]umber of 
doctors in the area” 
and “their age and 




profile of the 
population, 
“[s]ocioeco-nomic 






and office facilities 
for physicians”, 





Scholarships for medical students: 
CAD 5,000 per year (in 1987; amount 
equivalent to year-2000 USD 5,921).  
For each year the scholarship is received, 
the students agree to spend one calendar 
year in general practice in an underserved 
area after completion of internship. 
Direct financial incentives for physicians: 
CAD 10,000 per year served in an 
underserved area for a maximum of four 
years (between 1980 and 1988; amount 
equivalent to year-2000 USD 17,591 in 
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Location  Period  Objective  Population  Definition of 
underserved area 
Financial incentives and conditions  Evaluation  Other 








































HPSA status can 




status is assigned 







indicators of need 
(such as infant 
mortality) and 




Scholarships for students: 
Full scholarships covering tuition, fees, 
and “other reasonable educational 
expenses, such as books, supplies, and 
equipment” [25].   
For each year the scholarship is received, 
the students agree to serve one year at a 
location designated as HPSA, with a 
minimum commitment of 2 years. 
Loan repayments for physicians: 
Maximum repayment of USD 25,000 per 
year for a required initial 2-year contract 
(in 2007; amount equivalent to year-2000 
USD 20,336). One year amendments for 
a maximum of USD 35,000 per year (in 
2008; amount equivalent to year-2000 
USD 28,470).  












et al. 1996 
[48]; 
Cullen et al. 
1997 [49]; 
Rabinowitz 
et al. 2000 
[53]; 
Mofidi et al. 
2002 [67]; 
Probst et al. 
2003 [31]; 
Holmes 





al. 2006 [34] 
 
[25, 68] 
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underserved area 
Financial incentives and conditions  Evaluation  Other 






























Scholarships for medical students: 
Ranging from USD 650 to 11,000 per 
year (in 1980; lower amount equivalent to 
year-2000 USD 1,358 and higher amount 
equivalent to year-2000 USD 22,988). 
  









Oklahoma, US  Since 
1975 
“[T]o increase 
















Scholarships for medical students: 
USD 15,500 per year over 4 years (in 
2008; amount equivalent to year-2000 
USD 12,202). 
For each year the scholarship is received, 
the students agree to practice one year in 
a rural community in Oklahoma (after 






al. 2004 [35] 
[69] 
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Indian Health Service Corps: 
Up to USD 20,000 per year (in 2006; 
amount equivalent to year-2000 USD 
17,083). 
For each year the scholarship is received, 
the students agree to serve one year in an 
Indian health program, with a minimum 
commitment of 2 years (Indian Health 
Service 2006). 
State scholarships: 
See above and below. 
State loan repayment program:s 
See above and below. 





al. 2000 [52] 
[70] 
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Rural hospitals in 
the NSW Rural 
Hospital Network 
Scholarships for medical students: 
AUD 15,000 per year over the two final 
years of medical school (in 2007; amount 
equivalent to year-2000 USD 12,458).  
In return, the students agree to serve 2 of 
their first 3 postgraduate years in a rural 
hospital belonging to the NSW Rural 
Hospital Network. 
Dunbabin et 
al. 2006 [36] 
[71] 
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HPSA  CSP: scholarships for medical students:  
Amount determined by HPSA 
community who co-sponsors the 
scholarship (with additional funding from 
federal and state funds). 
For each year the scholarship is received, 
the students agree to serve one year in the 
HPSA where their home is located 
HSSP: scholarships for medical students: 
USD 10,000 (in 2001; amount equivalent 
to year-2000 USD 9,725) 
For the award, the students agree to serve 
2 years in an underserved area. 
RRCP: direct financial incentives to 
medical residents, physicians, and other 
qualified health personnel: 
Maximum of USD 20,000 per year for up 
to 6 years (in 2001; amount equivalent to 
year-2000 USD 19,450) 
For each year the award is received, the 
recipients agree to serve 1 year in an 
underserved area. 
SLRP: direct financial incentives to 
physicians and other qualified health 
professionals: 
Maximum of USD 40,000 (in 2001; 
amount equivalent to year-2000 USD 
38,901) for a commitment to serve 2 
years at a non-profit site in a HPSA.  The 
award can be received twice. 
Jackson et 
al. 2003 [37] 
N/A 
  40Program 
name 
Location  Period  Objective  Population  Definition of 
underserved area 
Financial incentives and conditions  Evaluation  Other 
studies  references 




















































Across all programs on average USD 
14,000 per year of service (in 1996; 
amount equivalent to year-2000 USD 
15,365) (differences between award 
means of the 5 program types not 
significant, p = 0.55). 
Scholarship programs: 
For each year the scholarship is received, 
the students agree to serve 1 year in an 
underserved area. 
Loan programs with service option: 
The medical students can either repay the 
loan at standard interest rates or repay the 
loan by serving 1 year in an underserved 
area per year of receipt of loan. 
Loan repayment programs: 
Medical residents commit to service in an 
underserved area in exchange for loan 
repayment (commitment usually near the 
end of residency training).  
Direct financial-incentive programs for 
medical residents: 
Medical residents commit to service in an 
underserved area in exchange for 
monetary reward (commitment usually at 
the beginning of the residency).  
Direct financial-incentive programs for 
fully trained health professionals: 
Medical residents commit to service in an 
underserved area in exchange for a 
monetary reward (commitment usually 
near the end of residency training). 
 
Pathman et 
al. 2004 [27] 
N/A 
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who have been 





least 2 weeks 
of work 
experience at 










Scholarships for students admitted to a 
tertiary health care education institution: 
“Funds for university tuition, books, 
residence fees and food” [26]. 
For each year the scholarship is received, 
the students agree to work one year as 
























Study  Topics  Study design  Sample and 
sample size 
Data sources  Outcome measures and effect 
sizes 





















who ever took 
part in the 
program  






Proportion of participants who 
had completed their practice 
obligation by 1973: 
Of 144 participants, 11 (8%) did 
not complete medical school or 
died. 
Of 133 participants available for 
practice, 74 (54%) completed the 
practice obligation and 5 (4%) 
repaid the financial incentive, 
while the remainder defaulted. 
Proportion of participants who 
practiced in small communities in 
1973 (43 years after program start 
and 29 years after program 
cessation): 
Of 99 former recipients still in 
practice in 1973, 50 (51%) 
practiced in communities of less 
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one of the state 
programs and 
were available 
for practice in 
1970 
(N = 1,089) 
 
Records of the 
individual 
state programs 
Proportion of participants who 
had completed or were completing 
their practice obligation in 1970: 
Of 1,089 participants available for 
practice, 658 (60%) completed or 
were completing their obligation 
and 406 (37%) repaid the financial 
incentive, while the remainder 
defaulted. 
Proportion of participants who 
remained in rural communities of 
their state after completion of 
obligation (neither date of 
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All students who 
were ever 
enrolled in the 
program between 
1945 and 1963 
(N = 320) 
 




Proportion of participants who 
had completed or were completing 
their practice obligation in 1963: 
Of 320 participants, 120 (38%) 
were still in school, post-graduate 
training or served in the military, 
46 (14%) withdrew from school or 
failed academically, and 13 (4%) 
withdrew their application or had 
died. 
Of 141 participants available for 
practice, 106 (75%) had completed 
or were completing their obligation 

















No control group  
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All students who 
ever participated 
in the program 
between 1953 





(N = 149) 






Proportion of participants who 
had completed or were completing 
their practice obligation in 1975: 
Of 149 participants, 67 (45%) 
served their obligation in a 
metropolitan area within Arizona, 
21 (14%) served their obligation in 
a non-metropolitan area in Arizona 
and 55 (37%) repaid the financial 
incentive, while the remainder 
defaulted.  
Proportion of participants who 
remained in rural communities of 
their state after completion of their 
obligation: 
>85% 
Time series of medical student 
density in Arizona: 
The per-capita number of medical 
students did not increase from 
1953 to 1967 (consistently 20% 
below national average), but 















The program did 






steep increase in 
per-capita 
medical students 
in 1968 is 
attributed to the 
opening of the 
first medical 
school in 














No analysis of 
time series 
undertaken 
except for visual 
impression 
No control for 
confounding by 
other variables 
that  changed 
over time 
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(N = 104) 
 
7 annual values 
(1966-1972) of 
the number of 
physicians in 














Proportion of participating 
medical students who had 
completed or were completing 
their practice obligation in 1974: 
Of 104 students, 55 (53%) 
completed or were completing 
their practice obligation and 49 
(47%) repaid the financial 
incentive. 
 
Proportion of students who in 1974 
had remained in the original 
placement location after 
completion of their obligation: 
74%  
 
Time series of total number of 
physicians (expressed relative to 
their 1966 baseline value): 
From 1966 to 1972 monotonic 
increase in the relative number of 
physicians in all Ontario (from 1.0 
to over 1.3) and in northern 
Ontario (from 1.0 to almost 1.2). 
From 1966 to 1969 slight decline 
in the relative number of 
physicians in communities in 
northern Ontario with population 
of less than 15,000 (i.e. before the 
program was introduced) and steep 
increase from 1970 (after 
introduction of the program) to 















The time series 























No analysis of 
time series 
undertaken 
except for visual 
impression 
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located) vs. in 
Ontario overall 







UAP in 1969)  












Physician population density in 
1986 relative to physician 
population density in 1956: 
1.86-4.88 across the 10 northern 
counties 
Location quotient (physician 
density in the counties of northern 
Ontario relative to the physician 
population density in Ontario as a 
whole) in 1986 relative to location 
quotient in 1956: 
0.88-1.33 across the northern 10 
counties  
 
The fact that the 
location quotient 
improved little 
over the 30-year 
observation 
period suggests 





(where most of 
the underserved 
areas in Ontario 
are located) was 
caused by an 
overall increase 
in physicians in 
the state rather 











(because not all 
communities in 
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that were eligible 





October 1975 to 
October 1976 
(N = 76) 
All communities 
that were eligible 
to receive a 
NHSC physician 
before August 
1975 and had 
never been 
staffed up to 
August 1977 










Staffed communities had 
significantly higher median family 
income, lower poverty prevalence, 
higher income growth, lower infant 
mortality, lower unemployment, 
and higher median educational 
attainment. 
Discriminant analysis: 
Seven variables contribute 
significantly and substantially to 
separation given the other variables 
in the discriminant function (sign 
of coefficient in parentheses): 
income growth (-), poverty 
prevalence (-), physician 
population density (-), employment 
ratio (+), infant mortality rate (-), 
median family income (+), 
proportion of people 65 years of 










are less likely to 












only the first few 







are measured at 
the level of the 
county) 
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practicing in a 
rural county who 
were selected in 
a national 
stratified sample 
in 1981, were 
still alive in 
1990, could be 
contacted and 
responded to a 
mail survey in 
1990 











at Chapel Hill 
 
Hazard ratio of non-retention in 
the same practice as in 1981: 
NHSC vs. non-NHSC physicians: 
2.11 (p < 0.0001) 
1.98 (p = 0.0002) (when 
controlling for training in internal 
medicine and stated importance of 
small community living) 
Hazard ratio of non-retention in 
any rural practice: NHSC vs. non-
NHSC physicians: 
1.74 (p < 0.004) 
1.56 (p = 0.02) (when controlling 
for training in internal medicine 





less likely to 
remain in their 
practice of 
original 
placement and in 






due to selective 
participation in 
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obligation in a 
rural HPSA from 
1987 to 1990 






age and career 
stage who began 
working in a 
rural HPSA from 
1987 to 1990   
(N = 206) 
  
Mail survey in 
1991 
Odds ratio of retention at first 
practice site: NHSC vs. non-NHSC 
physicians: 
0.56 (p = 0.004) after 3 years and 1 
month 
0.25 (p < 0.001) after 5 years and 1 
month 
0.41 (p = 0.01) after 5 years and 1 
month (when controlling for 
measures of community-physician 




less likely to 
remain in their 
practice of 
original 
placement in a 
HPSA than non-
NHSC 
physicians are to 
remain in their 





due to selective 
participation in 
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All primary care 
physicians 
placed through 
NHSC in a 
HPSA between 
1987 and 1990 
(N = 398) 
Mail survey in 
1991 
Relative risk of retention in 
practice entered between 1987 and 
1990: minority NHSC vs. non-
minority NHSC physicians: 





physicians do not 
differ in their 









No control of 
confounding 
NHSC  Rosenblatt 

























obligation in a 
rural area, and 
responded to the 
survey 
(N = 258) 
 
















Proportion of NHSC physicians 
who remain in the country of 
original placement (and average of 
6.1 years after the end of their 
obligation):  
25% 
Proportion of NHSC physicians 
who have left the county of original 
placement, but continue to practice 








practice in the 
county of their 
original 
placement or in 












retention not  
taken into 
account 
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and 1983 and 
were placed in a 
rural county 






Proportion of NHSC participants 
who remained in their rural county 
of original NHSC placement in 
December 1991: 
13% (among those graduated from 
medical school in 1975-1977) 
17% (1978-1980) 
20% (1981-1983) 
Proportion NHSC participants 
















No control group 
NHSC  Rabino-












of all allopathic 
and osteopathic 
physicians with a 
primary care 
specialty who 
graduated from a 
US medical 
school in 1983 or 
1984 






Mail survey in 
1993 
Odds ratio of “providing 
substantial care to the 
underserved”: NHSC vs. non-
NHSC physicians: 
2.2 (95% CI 1.6-3.0) (when 
controlling for sex, ethnicity, 
family income when growing up, 
childhood in inner-city/rural area, 
strong interest in underserved 
practice prior to medical school, 
clinical experience with the 




the NHSC is the 
only experiential 
factor related to 
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(N = 249) 
Mail survey in 
1998 
Proportion of NHSC dentists in 
1998 who provided care to an 
underserved population after 





































during 1998 who 





in 1969 or later 
and were not 
currently 
meeting a NHSC 
service 
obligation 




















Center at the 
University of 
North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill 
 
Odds ratio of being highly engaged 
in Medicaid inpatient practice in 
1998: NHSC alumni vs. non-NHSC 
alumni physicians: 
1.93 (95% CI 1.18-3.13) (when 
controlling for physician’s sex, 
ethnicity, medical specialty, period 
of graduation from medical school, 
medical education in South 
Carolina, graduation from a non-
US medical school)  
NHSC alumni 
are more likely 
to treat Medicaid 







due to selective 
participation in 





not taken into 
account 
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in 1977-1979  
(N = 19,253), 
1982-1984 
(N = 20,757), 
1987-1989 
(N = 19,500) 
First observation 
of practice 
location in 1981, 

























NHSC enrollee coefficients in 
multiple probit regression with 
location in community of first 
practice (five years after first 
observation of practice location) 
as outcome variable: 
Between -0.248 and -0.272 across 
the three graduation cohorts (all p 
< 0.01) (when controlling for age, 
sex, ethnicity) 
-0.466 (not sig.), -0.866 (p < 0.01), 
and -1.748 (p < 0.01) in the 1977-
1979, 1982-1984, and 1987-1989 
cohort, respectively (when 
controlling for age, sex, ethnicity, 
and controlling for endogeneity of 
decision to enroll in NHSC) 
NHSC enrollee coefficients in 
multiple probit regression with 
practice in any HPSA as outcome 
variable: 
Between 0.528 and 0.745 across 
the three graduation cohorts (all p 
< 0.01) (when controlling for age, 
sex, ethnicity) 
0.482 (not sig.), 0.745 (p < 0.01), 
0.161 (not sig.) in the 1977-1979, 
1982-1984, and 1987-1989 cohort, 
respectively (when controlling for 
age, sex, ethnicity, and controlling 
for endogeneity of decision to 




less likely to 






of the decision to 







more likely to 











the decision to 














used in selection 
models to control 
for selective 
participation in 
the NHSC may 
not be valid 
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(N = 772) 
HPSA counties 
that received 




0 years of 
staffing  
(N = 172) 
1-7 years of 
staffing 
(N = 293) 
8-11 years of 
staffing 
(N = 84) 
12-15 years of 









Age-adjusted all-cause mortality 
rates (standardized to the 1981-




HPSA, 0 years staffing: 
1.022/0.982 
HPSA, 1-7 years staffing:  
1.027/0.992  
HPSA, 8-11 years staffing:  
1.092/1.055 







mortality rates in 















than in all HPSA 





15 years.  It is 
possible that 
NHSC staffing is 
only effective in 
reducing 
mortality rates if 
it is continuous 
over extended 
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All rural HPSA 





1984 and at least 
3 of the 
preceding 5 
years 
(N = 141) 
All rural HPSA 




















NHSC staffing coefficients in 
multiple linear regression with 
ratio change in non-NHSC 
primary care physician density 
from 1981 to 2001 as outcome 
variable: 
1.06 (p < 0.01) (when controlling 
for population size, ethnic 
composition, per-capita income, 
poverty prevalence, youth 
unemployment rate, education, 
presence of a hospital, presence of 
a community or migrant health 
center, non-NHSC primary care 
physician population density at 
baseline, presence of at least one 
non-NHSC primary care physician 
at baseline) 
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and 1977 and 
had graduated in 
1980 





Proportion of participants who 
practiced in the Navajo Indian 
reservation or immediately 
adjacent communities after 
graduation: 
Of 124 participants, 34 (27%) 
continued their education, 9 (7%) 
were lost to follow-up or died, 5 
(4%) were unemployed and 76 
(62%) were employed 
Of the 76 participants available for 
practice, 56 (74%) worked in the 
Navajo Indian reservation or 
immediately adjacent 
communities, while the remainder 
did not serve in those areas. 
 




to serve in a 










No control group 
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1976 to 1985 







Proportion of participants who met 
their obligation through service in 
rural or underserved areas in 
Oklahoma: 
Of 138 students, 94 (68%) met 
their obligation through service, 






















































Proportion of participants who met 
their obligation through service in 
rural or underserved areas in 
Oklahoma: 
Of 544 participants available for 
practice, 407 (75%) had completed 
or were completing their obligation 
and 138 (25%) repaid the financial 
incentive.
3
Proportion of participants who 
remained in the original placement 
community upon completion of 
their obligation: 
Of 313 students, 167 (53%) 
remained in the original placement 
community, 91 (29%) relocated to 
another community in Oklahoma, 





















                                                 
3 The true absolute numbers may be slightly different, because they were derived from percentages that are shown rounded to the first integer in the source study 
[35]. 
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of all physicians 
who graduated 
from US medical 
schools in either 
1988 or 1992 
and were listed 
four years after 














Proportions of financial-incentive 
program participants vs. non-
participants who practiced in any 
rural area in 1999: 
33.3 vs. 6.5% (p < 0.001) 
Average proportion of Medicaid 
and uninsured patients of all 
patients who are cared for by 
participants vs. non-participants in 
1999: 
54.1 vs. 29.4% (p < 0.001) 
The positive association of 
participation with practice in rural 
areas and with the proportion of 
Medicaid and uninsured patients 
remained significant “while 
controlling for selected 







more likely to 
practice in a 








due to selective 
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(N = 82) 
 








Mail survey in 
2004 
Proportion of participants (1989-
2004 cohort) who had completed 
or were completing their practice 
obligation in 2004: 
Of 157 participants, 4 (3%) did not 
graduate from medical school. 
Of the 153 participants who 
graduated from medical school, 
133 (87%) had completed or were 
completing their practice 
obligation and 20 (13%) withdrew 
from the program. 
Proportion of participants (1989-
1998 cohort) who had completed 
their rural service and (in 2004) 
were practicing in a rural 
community: 
Of 82 former cadets, 35 (43%) 
were working in a rural area 





obligation is high 
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in at least 1 of 
the 4 incentive 
programs who 
had completed at 
least 1 year of 
their obligation 
(N = 105 for 
study of program 
result, N = 44 for 
study of program 
effect) 








as “rural” by 
both the federal 
Office of 
Management and 
Budget and the 
West Virginia 
Rural Health  
Education 
Partnership 










Mail survey in 
2002 
Proportion of participants who 
had completed or were completing 
their practice obligation in 2002: 
Of 105 participants available for 
practice, 82 (78%) had completed 
or were completing their practice 
obligation and 23 (22%) repaid the 
financial incentive. 
Comparison of the proportion of 
participants vs. the proportion of 
all other primary care physicians 
who were still practicing at their 
first practice site in 2002: 
“Obligated physicians were less 
likely to leave their service sites 
during the first 4 years of practice 
than were non-obligated 
physicians. After obligations were 
completed and physicians were 
free to leave, retention dropped 
into the range seen among 
nonobligated physicians.” 
After 4 years, 32% of all 
participants were no longer at their 
first practice site, compared with 
38% of all other primary care 







Retention in the 









No control of 
confounding 
Selection bias 
due to selective 
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All primary care 
physicians 
serving or having 
served their 
obligation in 
1991 or 1996 
(N = 330) 
Stratified 
random sample 
of all graduates 
of US allopathic 
and osteopathic 
medical schools 
in 1988 and 1992 
who 4 years after 
graduation were 
in primary care 
practice in the 
US and were not 
obligated to 
serve in a 
specific location 

















Mail survey in 
1998 and 1999 
Proportion of program 
participants who had completed 
their practice obligation by 2004: 
44.7% (average of service-option 
loan programs) 
66.5% (average of scholarship 
programs) 
93.0% (average of all other 
programs) 
Proportion of program 
participants who had repaid the 
financial incentive by 2004: 
49.2% (average of service-option 
loan programs) 
27.2% (average of scholarship 
programs) 
2.3% (average of all other 
programs) 
Hazard ratio of retention at first 
practice site: program participants 
vs. program non-participants: 
0.70 (p = 0.029) 
0.75 (p = 0.080) (when controlling 



















Retention in the 
first practice site 














due to selective 
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in the program 
between 1999 
and 2002 and 
who graduated 






Proportion of participants who 
practiced in Umkhanyakude 
district after graduation: 
Of 24 participants who graduated, 
1 (0.4%) died and 3 (1%) pursued 
further education or training.  Of 
20 participants available for 
service, 20 (100%) had completed 


















The term underserved area in the table encompasses a specific underserved area, any underserved area, and underserved populations.  WWII = Second World War, HPSA = Health 











Table 4: Studies of program effect 
 
    Observed outcome 
    Same area as at baseline  Any underserved area 
All physicians  Retention in the same area: 
Holmes 2004 
Pathman et al. 2004 
Provision of care in any underserved area: 
Rabinowitz et. al. 2000 
Probst et al. 2003 
Holmes 2004 









Physicians who work 
in an underserved area 
at baseline 
Retention in the same underserved area: 
Pathman et al. 1992 
Pathman et al. 1994 
Jackson et al. 2003 
 
Retention in any underserved area: 











1. JLI:  Human resources for health: overcoming the crisis. Boston: Harvard University 
Press; 2004. 
2.  World Health Organization: Working together for health: the World Health Report 
2006. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2006. 
3.  Brooks RG, Walsh M, Mardon RE, Lewis M, Clawson A: The roles of nature and 
nurture in the recruitment and retention of primary care physicians in rural 
areas: a review of the literature. Acad Med 2002, 77(8):790-798. 
4.  Council on Graduate Medical Education: Physician distribution and health care 
challenges in rural and inner-city areas. Rockville, MD: CBME; 1998. 
5.  Calman N, Hauser D: Physician distribution in health professional shortage areas: 
supplement report to the bureau of health professions. New York: The Institute for 
Urban Family Health; 2005. 
6.  Lehmann U, Dieleman M, Martineau T: Staffing remote rural areas in middle- and 
low-income countries: a literature review of attraction and retention. BMC health 
services research 2008, 8:19. 
7.  Bärnighausen T, Bloom DE, Humair S: Human Resources for Treating HIV/AIDS: 
Needs, Capacities, and Gaps. AIDS Patient Care STDS 2007. 
8.  Stilwell B, Diallo K, Zurn P, Vujicic M, Adams O, Dal Poz M: Migration of health-
care workers from developing countries: strategic approaches to its management. 
Bulletin of the World Health Organization 2004, 82(8):595-600. 
9. Dovlo  D:  Migration of nurses from sub-Saharan Africa: a review of issues and 
challenges. Health services research 2007, 42(3 Pt 2):1373-1388. 
10. Mullan  F:  The muscular Samaritan: the National Health Service Corps in the new 
century. Health affairs (Project Hope) 1999, 18(2):168-175. 
11.  Brooks RG, Mardon R, Clawson A: The rural physician workforce in Florida: a 
survey of US- and foreign-born primary care physicians. J Rural Health 2003, 
19(4):484-491. 
12.  Bärnighausen T, Bloom DE: "Conditional scholarships" for HIV/AIDS health 
workers: educating and retaining the workforce to provide antiretroviral 
treatment in sub-Saharan Africa National Bureau of Economic Research Working 
Paper 13396 2007. 
13. Sempowski  IP:  Effectiveness of financial incentives in exchange for rural and 
underserviced area return-of-service commitments: systematic review of the 
literature. Can J Rural Med 2004, 9(2):82-88. 
14.  Cochrane Collaboration open learning material for reviewers 
[http://www.cochrane-net.org/openlearning/HTML/mod0.htm] 
15.  Shojania KG, Sampson M, Ansari MT, Ji J, Doucette S, Moher D: How quickly do 
systematic reviews go out of date? A survival analysis. Annals of internal medicine 
2007, 147(4):224-233. 
16.  Medical subject headings [http://www.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/] 
17.  Hsu RH, Roberts MW, Tulloch JF, Trotman CA: A study of military recruitment 
strategies for dentists: possible implications for academia. Journal of dental 
education 2007, 71(4):501-510. 
  6618.  Solomon SS, Tom SC, Pichert J, Wasserman D, Powers AC: Impact of medical 
student research in the development of physician-scientists. J Investig Med 2003, 
51(3):149-156. 
19.  Watt CD, Greeley SA, Shea JA, Ahn J: Educational views and attitudes, and career 
goals of MD-PhD students at the University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine. 
Acad Med 2005, 80(2):193-198. 
20.  DerSimonian R, Laird N: Meta-analysis in clinical trials. Controlled clinical trials 
1986, 7(3):177-188. 
21.  Helmes E, Jackson DN: A comparison of methods of normalizing a discrete 
distribution. Journal of clinical psychology 1982, 38(3):581-587. 
22. Cochran  WG:  The combination of estimates from different experiments. Biometrics 
1954, 1954(10):101-129. 
23. World  Bank:  World development indicators. Washington: World Bank; 2007. 
24.  Consumer Price Indices [http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm] 
25.  Abouth NHSC [http://nhsc.bhpr.hrsa.gov/about/] 
26.  Ross AJ, Couper ID: Rural scholarship schemes: a solution to the human resource 
crisis in rural district hospitals? South African Family Practice 2004, 46(1):5-6. 
27.  Pathman DE, Konrad TR, King TS, Taylor DH, Jr., Koch GG: Outcomes of states' 
scholarship, loan repayment, and related programs for physicians. Medical care 
2004, 42(6):560-568. 
28.  Rabinowitz HK, Diamond JJ, Markham FW, Hazelwood CE: A program to increase 
the number of family physicians in rural and underserved areas: impact after 22 
years. JAMA 1999, 281(3):255-260. 
29.  Wilson DR, Woodhead-Lyons SC, Moores DG: Alberta's Rural Physician Action 
Plan: an integrated approach to education, recruitment and retention. Cmaj 1998, 
158(3):351-355. 
30.  Strosberg MA, Mullan F, Winsberg GR: Service-conditional medical student aid 
programs: The experience of the states. Journal of medical education 1982, 
57(8):586-592. 
31.  Probst JC, Samuels ME, Shaw TV, Hart GL, Daly C: The National Health Service 
Corps and Medicaid inpatient care: experience in a southern state. Southern 
medical journal 2003, 96(8):775-783. 
32. Holmes  GM:  Does the national health service corps improve physician supply in 
underserved locations? Eastern Economic Journal 2004, 30(4):563-581. 
33.  Pathman DE, Fryer GE, Green LA, Phillips RL: Changes in age-adjusted mortality 
rates and disparities for rural physician shortage areas staffed by the National 
Health Service Corps: 1984-1998. J Rural Health 2005, 21(3):214-220. 
34.  Pathman DE, Fryer GE, Jr., Phillips RL, Smucny J, Miyoshi T, Green LA: National 
Health Service Corps staffing and the growth of the local rural non-NHSC 
primary care physician workforce. J Rural Health 2006, 22(4):285-293. 
35.  Lapolla M, Brandt EN, Jr., Barker A, Ryan L: State public policy: the impacts of 
Oklahoma's physician incentive programs. The Journal of the Oklahoma State 
Medical Association 2004, 97(5):190-194. 
36.  Dunbabin JS, McEwin K, Cameron I: Postgraduate medical placements in rural 
areas: their impact on the rural medical workforce. Rural Remote Health 2006, 
6(2):481. 
  6737.  Jackson J, Shannon CK, Pathman DE, Mason E, Nemitz JW: A comparative 
assessment of West Virginia's financial incentive programs for rural physicians. J 
Rural Health 2003, 19 Suppl:329-339. 
38. Bradbury  SF:  The North Carolina Medical Care Commission. Evaluation of the 
Rural Loan Program by Recipients of Medical and Dental Loans. North Carolina 
medical journal 1963, 24:489-491. 
39. Pathman  DE:  What outcomes should we expect from programs that pay 
physicians' training expenses in exchange for service? North Carolina medical 
journal 2006, 67(1):77-82. 
40.  Bass M, Copeman WJ: An Ontario solution to medically underserviced areas: 
evaluation of an ongoing program. Canadian Medical Journal 1975, 113:403-407. 
41.  Weiss LD, Wiese WH, Goodman AB: Scholarship support for Indian students in 
the health sciences: an alternative method to address shortages in the underserved 
area. Public Health Rep 1980, 95(3):243-246. 
42.  Holmes JE, Miller DA: A study of 138 return service scholarship applications 
awarded by the Oklahoma Physician Manpower Training Commission. The 
Journal of the Oklahoma State Medical Association 1985, 78(10):384-388. 
43. Ross  AJ:  Success of a scholarship scheme for rural students. South African medical 
journal = Suid-Afrikaanse tydskrif vir geneeskunde 2007, 97(11):1087-1090. 
44. Mason  HR:  Effectiveness of student aid programs tied to a service commitment. 
Journal of medical education 1971, 46(7):575-583. 
45.  Navin TR, Nichols AW: Evaluation of the Arizona Medical Student Exchange 
Program. Journal of medical education 1977, 52(10):817-823. 
46.  Fitz RH, Mawardi BH, Wilber J: Scholarships for rural medicine. The 
Commonwealth Fund experience with a pre-World War II indenture program. 
Transactions of the American Clinical and Climatological Association 1977, 88:191-
196. 
47.  Pathman DE, Konrad TR: Minority physicians serving in rural National Health 
Service Corps sites. Medical care 1996, 34(5):439-454. 
48.  Rosenblatt RA, Saunders G, Shreffler J, Pirani MJ, Larson EH, Hart LG: Beyond 
retention: National Health Service Corps participation and subsequent practice 
locations of a cohort of rural family physicians. The Journal of the American Board 
of Family Practice / American Board of Family Practice 1996, 9(1):23-30. 
49.  Cullen TJ, Hart LG, Whitcomb ME, Rosenblatt RA: The National Health Service 
Corps: rural physician service and retention. The Journal of the American Board of 
Family Practice / American Board of Family Practice 1997, 10(4):272-279. 
50.  Pathman DE, Konrad TR, Ricketts TC, 3rd: The comparative retention of National 
Health Service Corps and other rural physicians. Results of a 9-year follow-up 
study. JAMA 1992, 268(12):1552-1558. 
51.  Pathman DE, Konrad TR, Ricketts TC, 3rd: The National Health Service Corps 
experience for rural physicians in the late 1980s. JAMA 1994, 272(17):1341-1348. 
52.  Pathman DE, Konrad TR, King TS, Spaulding C, Taylor DH: Medical training debt 
and service commitments: the rural consequences. J Rural Health 2000, 16(3):264-
272. 
  6853.  Rabinowitz HK, Diamond JJ, Veloski JJ, Gayle JA: The impact of multiple 
predictors on generalist physicians' care of underserved populations. American 
journal of public health 2000, 90(8):1225-1228. 
54.  Anderson M, Rosenberg MW: Ontario's underserviced area program revisited: an 
indirect analysis. Social science & medicine (1982) 1990, 30(1):35-44. 
55.  Woolf MA, Uchill VL, Jacoby I: Demographic factors associated with physician 
staffing in rural areas: the experience of the National Health Service Corps. 
Medical care 1981, 19(4):444-451. 
56.  Pathman DE, Konrad TR, Dann R, Koch G: Retention of primary care physicians in 
rural health professional shortage areas. American journal of public health 2004, 
94(10):1723-1729. 
57.  Greenland S, Morgenstern H: Ecological bias, confounding, and effect modification. 
International journal of epidemiology 1989, 18(1):269-274. 
58.  35 years of excellence: access today for healthier communities tomorrow 
[http://nhsc.bhpr.hrsa.gov/about/history.asp] 
59. Woodhall  M:  Student loans: potential, problems, and lessons from international 
experience. JHEA/RESA 2004, 2(2):37-51. 
60.  Kober K, Van Damme W: Public sector nurses in Swaziland: can the downturn be 
reversed? Hum Resour Health 2006, 4:13. 
61.  Dovlo D, Nyonator F: Migration by graduates of the University of Ghana Medical 
School: a preliminary rapid appraisal. Human Resources for Health Development 
Journal 1999, 3(1):40-51. 
62. Nigenda  G:  The regional distribution of doctors in Mexico, 1930-1990: a policy 
assessment. Health policy (Amsterdam, Netherlands) 1997, 39:107-122. 
63.  Bolduc D, Fortin B, Fournier MA: The effect of incentive policies on the practice 
location of doctors: a multinomial probit analysis. Journal of Labor Economics 
1996, 14(4). 
64. Ricketts  TC:  The changing nature of rural health care. Annual review of public 
health 2000, 21:639-657. 
65.  Rosenblatt RA, Whitcomb ME, Cullen TJ, Lishner DM, Hart LG: Which medical 
schools produce rural physicians? JAMA 1992, 268(12):1559-1565. 
66. Copeman  WJ:  The underserviced area program of the Ministry of Health of 
Ontario. Canadian Family Physician 1987, 33:1683-1685. 
67.  Mofidi M, Konrad TR, Porterfield DS, Niska R, Wells B: Provision of care to the 
underserved populations by National Health Service Corps alumni dentists. 
Journal of public health dentistry 2002, 62(2):102-108. 
68.  Politzer RM, Trible LQ, Robinson TD, Heard D, Weaver DL, Reig SM, Gaston M: The 
National Health Service Corps for the 21st century. The Journal of ambulatory care 
management 2000, 23(3):70-85. 
69.  Rural medical education scholarship loan program 
[http://www.pmtc.state.ok.us/ruraled.htm] 
70.  Indian Health Service: Loan repayment program. Rockville, MD: Indian Health 
Service; 2006. 
71.  NSW rural resident medical officer cadetship 
[http://www.nswrdn.com.au/site/index.cfm?module=RDNSCHOLARSHIPS&leca=82
&pagemode=indiv&page_id=1839 
  69